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specifically orders to the contrary in 
a particular case. 
Seeking to ascertain the legislative in-
tent of section 4-609, the court made an 
extensive review of the statute's legisla-
tive history. The court found that presen-
tence investigations were first addressed 
in 1953 Md. Laws, ch. 625, which pro-
vided that the Board of Parole and Proba-
tion would be available to the judges of 
the circuit courts "for the purpose of 
making presentence or other investiga-
tions" requested by the court. 
In 1968, the statute was expanded to 
include judges of any court of limited 
criminal jurisdiction, "including, but not 
limited to the Municipal Court of Balti-
more City, any people's court or any trial 
magistrate, . . . in all cases which may 
include commitment for two or more 
years .... "Md. Ann. Code art. 41 §124 
(Supp. 1968). 1972 Md. Laws, ch. 532 
made presentencing investigations avail-
able in cases where the commitment was 
for less than two years, and present sub-
section (c) was added in 1976. In 1982, 
misdemeanors were added to the list of 
crimes entitling a defendant to an inves-
tigation and, in 1983, the investigation 
was made mandatory in any case in which 
the death penalty was requested. In 
1987, the requirement for a presen-
tencing report was further extended to 
include cases where imprisonment for 
life without a possibility of parole is re-
quested. 
Reading the plain language of section 
4-609 in the context of the legislative his-
tory of the statute, the court of appeals 
determined that the statute reflected an 
obvious legislative preference for the use 
of presentence investigation reports, 
and determined that to overcome the 
presumption in favor of these reports, a 
court must have a valid reason, particular 
to the facts of a given case, for refusing to 
order an investigation. The court reiter-
ated that a presentence report in capital 
cases is mandatory. In all cases falling 
within subsection (c) (1), the presen-
tencing report also must be prepared 
and considered, unless the court orders 
to the contrary. 
The court observed that a trial judge is 
vested with broad discretionary powers, 
including the power to fashion an appro-
priate sentence. The court noted how-
ever, that this discretion is limited. This 
judicial discretion must be reflected in 
the record, and it must not be arbitrary or 
capricious, otherwise, the court's action 
is erroneous. Nelson, 315 Md. at 70, 553 
A.2d at 671. 
In the case sub judice, the trial judge 
refused to order an investigation, be-
cause: 1) there had been no showing that 
there was anything pertaining to the de-
fendant's background that the defense 
lawyer himself could not have devel-
oped; and 2) the process was costly. The 
court of appeals rejected both reasons. 
In the court's view, placing the burden 
on defense counsel to point out with 
specificity, to the satisfaction of the 
judge, that a presentence investigation 
should be ordered was clearly contrary to 
the statute. Under section 4-609 the 
burden is on the judge to show why an in-
vestigation should not be conducted. 
The trial judge's belief that the issue of 
cost was relevant to ordering an investi-
gation had no basis in either the language 
or the history of the statute. Nelson, 315 
Md. at 71-72,553 A.2d at 671-72. 
According to the court of appeals, the 
trial judge had required his own condi-
tions to be met before a presentence 
investigation would be ordered: an ini-
tial investigation by defense counsel, the 
uncovering of a fact requiring additional 
explanation, and a finding that the fact to 
be explained was relevant to the imposi-
tion of a fair sentence. Thus, the trial 
court's denial of the presentence investi-
gation was an abuse of discretion. The 
court of appeals reversed the judgment 
of the court of special appeals to the 
extent that the sentence imposed by the 
Circuit Court for Baltimore City was af-
firmed, and remanded the case for resen-
tencing with the benefit of a presentence 
investigation report. 
The decision inNelson is an attempt to 
accommodate two significant interests: 
the interest in fair sentencing based on 
the best available information, and the 
interest in historic deference to judicial 
discretion. In holding that presentence 
investigations in serious noncapital cases 
are required, unless the judge provides 
adequate reasons to support a denial, the 
court severely restricted the trial judge's 
discretionary power in this area. 
-Suzanne R. Cohn 
Texas v. Johnson: FlAG-BURNING 
AS PROTEST PROTECTED 
WITHIN CONTEXT OF FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
In Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. _, 109 
S. Ct. 2533 (1989), the United States 
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held 
that the conviction of a protestor for 
burning an American flag as part of a 
political demonstration violated the first 
amendment to the United States 
Constitution. 
The Republican National Convention 
was held in Dallas, Texas in 1984. A 
political demonstration took place in the 
city streets during the convention. The 
demonstration was staged to protest the 
policies of the Reagan Administration, 
the nomination of President Reagan for 
reelection and the activities of several 
Dallas-based corporations. The protest 
culminated at the Dallas City Hall where 
Gregory Lee Johnson poured kerosene 
on an American flag and set it ablaze. 
Although the protestors chanted anti-
American slogans over the burning flag, 
they did not threaten or injure any by-
standers. 
Johnson was charged and convicted 
under a Texas statute of desecrating a 
venerated object. His conviction was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth District of Texas. However, the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals re-
versed, holding that johnson's actions 
were the equivalent of symbolic speech 
and were protected by the first amend-
ment. The state argued that two separate 
interests supported Johnson's convic-
tion: "preserving the flag as a symbol of 
national unity and preventing breaches 
of the peace."Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2537. 
The court of criminal appeals rejected· 
the state's arguments on both points. It 
noted that although the Supreme Court 
had not yet decided whether a state could 
criminalize flag-burning to protect the 
symbolic value of the flag, a government 
could not impose upon its citizens beliefs 
or messages associated with a symbol of 
unity and that the first amendment pro-
tects differences of opinion with respect 
to such symbols. [d. The Texas court also 
believed thatJohnson's conduct did not 
seriously threaten the status of the flag 
nor did it lessen the flag's symbolic value. 
[d. 
Pertaining to the second interest, the 
court of criminal appeals noted that the 
desecration statute was not limited in 
scope to punishing only those acts that 
were likely to result in breaches of the 
peace and also pointed out that 
johnson's actions, while offensive to 
most, were not likely to (and in fact did 
not) cause a breach of the peace. Addi-
tionally, the court noted that Texas had 
another statute that specifically ad-
dressed breaches of the peace, and if the 
state was truly interested in punishing 
Johnson for this reason it could have 
done so without punishing him for flag-
burning. Since the court found the dese-
cration statute to be unconstitutional as 
applied, it did not reach the issue of 
whether the statute was facially 
unconstitutional. [d. at 2537-38. 
The United States Supreme Court also 
chose to resolve the case on an "as ap-
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plied" basis. The Court reasoned that the 
desecration statute dealt with physical 
conduct pertaining to the flag, and, al-
though it required "knowing" conduct, it 
was possible for such conduct to be non-
expressive and, therefore, not protected 
by the first amendment. The statute 
would survive a facial attack in such 
cases. 
In an opinion delivered by Justice 
Brennan, the Court decided whether 
johnson's conduct was expressive con-
duct which would permit first amend-
ment protection. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 
2539. Central to this determination was 
whether" '[a]n intent to convey a par-
ticularized message was present, and 
[whether] the likelihood was great that 
the message would be understood by 
those who viewed it.''' Id. (quoting 
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-
11 (1974)). The Court noted that it had 
previously recognized other types of 
expressive conduct involving the Ameri-
can flag. "[The Court has] had little 
difficulty identifying an expressive ele-
ment in conduct relating to flags .... " Id. 
at 2539. However, the Court continued 
to analyze this conduct in the context in 
which it occurred. Id. at 2540. Three 
factors led the Court to conclude that 
Johnson's conduct was " 'sufficiently 
imbued with elements of communica-
tion.'" Id. (quoting Spence, 418 U.S. at 
409). First, Texas conceded at oral argu-
ment that Johnson's conduct was expres-
sive. Second, the flag-burning occurred 
as part of a political demonstration. 
Third, Johnson stated at his trial that he 
meant his actions to be " 'a more power-
ful statement of symbolic speech .... ' " 
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540 (quoting 
from the trial record). Thus, the Court 
agreed with the Texas Court of Criminal 
Appeals that johnson's conduct was 
deserving of first amendment protec-
tion. 
The Court proceeded with an analysis 
of the state's asserted interests in support 
of Johnson's conviction. In United 
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), 
the Court held that" 'a sufficiently impor-
tant governmental interest in regulating' 
the nonspeech element can justify inci-
dental limitations on First Amendment 
freedoms ... .' " Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 
2540, (quoting O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 
376)). The O'Brien test requires the in-
terests to be .. 'unrelated to the suppres-
sion offree expression.'" Id. (quoting 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377)). 
In determining the applicability ofthe 
O'Brien test, the Court first considered 
the issue of the state's interest in prevent-
ing breaches of the peace. The Court 
held that the facts on the record did not 
support this interest. The Court agreed 
with the court of criminal appeals that 
Johnson's conduct was not likely to have 
caused a breach of the peace. It asserted 
that the state had improperly concluded 
that actions which might seriously offend 
others would always lead to breaches of 
the peace.Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2541-42. 
The Court expressed that the free 
speech protected by the first amendment 
is not just that which is agreeable or inof-
fensive. The primary" 'function of free 
speech ... is to invite dispute. It 
may ... best serve its high purpose when 
it induces a condition of unrest ... or 
even stirs people to anger.' " [d. at 2541 
(quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 
U.S. 1, 4 (1949)). The Court further 
explained that Johnson's conduct was 
not an invitation to fight and was not 
likely to have caused such a result. [d. at 
2542. 
Concurrent with the court of criminal 
appeals, the Court noted that a separate 
statute for breaches of the peace existed 
and could have been used by the state to 
protect its asserted interest. [d. 
Next, the Court considered the state's 
second interest, preserving the flag as a 
symbol of national unity. The Court 
noted that in Spence, the State of Wash-
ington wished to prohibit affIXing a 
peace symbol to the flag. An analogy was 
made to Johnson's conduct, that Texas' 
interest, like Washington's, was related 
to prohibiting such expressive conduct. 
Therefore, the Court reasoned that this 
also could not be a justifiable incidental 
limitation under O'Brien. [d. 
Although the Court held the O'Brien 
test inapplicable, it noted that where a 
governmental interest was related to 
expression, a "more demanding stan-
dard" for justification of first amendment 
limitations maybe applied.Johnson, 109 
S. Ct. at 2539. The Court opined that the 
desecration statute was designed to pro-
tect others from being offended by the 
proscribed conduct. This interpretation 
of the statute meant that Johnson's con-
duct was being restricted because of its 
content. [d. at 2543. Therefore, the 
state's interest in preserving the symbolic 
value of the flag was subject to" 'the most 
exacting scrutiny.'" [d. (quoting Boos v. 
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)). 
Regardless, the state maintained that 
any message conveyed by physical treat-
ment of the flag which threatens the 
concepts that the flag embodies, namely, 
nationhood and national unity, is harm-
ful and may be prohibited by a state. [d. 
at 2544. The Court rejected this argu-
ment and reiterated its rationale from 
other "flag cases," that the Constitution 
guarantees freedom to espouse contrary 
opinions, including those concerning 
the nation's fundamental principles and 
the American flag. [d. at 2544-46. Conse-
quently, a government may not promote 
certain ideas and actions concerning the 
flag and prohibit others. [d. 
Brennan concluded by stating that the 
decision would enhance the symbolic 
value of the flag. By consistent applica-
tion of the freedoms guaranteed by the 
Constitution and embodied in the flag, 
the Court believed that "toleration of 
criticism such as Johnson's is a sign and 
source of our strength." [d. at 2547. He 
suggested that the most effective counter 
to one who defiles the flag is to demon-
strate reverence for it. "We do not conse-
crate the flag by punishing its desecra-
tion, for in doing so we dilute the free-
dom that this cherished emblem repre-
sents." [d. at 2547-48. 
Justice Kennedy, anticipating the 
negative reaction to the Court's decision, 
voiced the emotional concerns that were 
not present in the majority opinion. In a 
concurring opinion, he noted that the 
results are sometimes hard to take, but 
nevertheless, "are right, right in the sense 
that the law and the Constitution, as we 
see them, compel the result." Johnson 
109 S. Ct. at 2548. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in a dissent 
joined by Justices White and O'Connor, 
noted the historical significa~ce of the 
flag throughout the nation's existence. 
Moreover, he highlighted the many fed-
eral and state statutes regarding proper 
treatment· and display of the flag. His 
dissent, along with Justice Stevens' dis-
sent, emphasized that the flag's revered 
place has been established by history, 
and "the government is simply recogniz-
ing as a fact the profound regard for the 
American flag created by that history" 
through government regulation. 
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2555. The dissent 
also stated that the Court should be ex-
tremely wary of placing limits on legisla-
tive majorities. [d. 
Thus, the Supreme Court refused to 
carve an exception for the American flag 
from the protection of the first amend-
ment. Following its reasoning from 
other "flag cases," the Court broadened 
the doctrine offree speech. When done 
as a form of protest, the Court considers 
flag-burning to constitute expressive 
conduct. Persons who choose to express 
themselves in this manner will be af-
forded the protection guaranteed by the 
first amendment. 
-Brian M. Kurtyka 
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A LEITER TO ALUMNI FROM THE lAW LIBRARY 
To Our Friends: 
This is the story of an individual with creativity and community spirit. Margaret Meehling graduated from the 
University of Baltimore School of Law in the Spring of 1989. While a student at the School of Law, Ms. Meehling 
was a frequent visitor to the Law School Library and during her senior year, she was a frequent user of Volume 
93 of the Supreme Court Reporter. She was writing a paper, and she wanted that particular volume because it 
contained the Supreme Court's famous decision in Roe v. Wade. She discovered that lots of other people had also 
made use of Volume 93, and though the Library owned two copies, both copies were in very bad condition. 
Seeing that the bindings were in shreds and the books barely holding together, Ms. Meehling decided that the 
Library really ought to have at least one new copy of Volume 93 of the Supreme Court Reporter. Then, she did 
the most wonderful thing: Ms. Meehling sent a check to the Law Library for $42.75, the exact cost of a replacement 
copy of Volume 93! 
We in the Law Library would like to thank Ms. Meehling for her thoughtful gift. We would also like to extend 
an offer to all University of Baltimore School of Law graduates and all other users of the Law Library: Why not adopt 
a book? Donate $50.00 to the University of Baltimore Education Foundation, earmarked for the library to purchase 
a replacement copy of a specific volume. Send us the name of your favorite case, or one you remember for any 
reason. How about the time you got yelled at in class because you hadn't read the material? How about the reporter 
which was shelved closest to your favorite study carrel? Or a state code from the state where you were born? 
If the volume is in bad shape, we'll replace it and put a book plate in the new one, acknowledging your generous 
gift. If the volume is not in need of replacing, we'll put a book plate in it anyway, and use your $50.00 to purchase 
other, much-needed materials for the Law Library. 
Margaret Meehling and I challenge you to join the club! 
An Important Note: Of course, this gift is not a substitute for your donation to the Annual Giving Program. Please 
think of your adopted Volume(s) as an extra special extra. 
Thanks, 
Emily R. Greenberg 
Law Library Director 
Emily R. Greenberg 
Librarian 
University of Baltimore 
Law Library 
1415 Maryland Avenue 
Baltimore, MD 21201 
Dear Emily, 
(Cut along this line and return this form with your check) 
I am happy to participate in your Adopt-A-Book program, and I am enclosing $50.00 for the library to purchase 
one volume. 
__ Yes, Please. I would like you to acknowledge my gift with a book plate in this book: 
__ No particular favorite book. Please buy the volume of your choice and include a book plate. 
My name is: 
3~TheuwFol~ru;mv.~20a.l1~======================================~------------------------------------------------
